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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRSHAD A. AADIL, 
Appellant, 
Case No. CA-880604-CA 
vs . 
Case Priority No.: 14(b) 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., 
INC., a California corporation, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A, INC. 
Appeal from Judgment of Dismissal of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the trial court properly entered its Judgment 
of Dismissal because appellant's Amended Complaint fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted? 
II. Whether this Court will assume the correctness of the 
lower court's judgment where, as here, appellant fails to cite 
the Record to support his factual contentions on appeal and 
further mischaracterizes the Record on procedural matters? 
III. Whether this Court should refuse to consider issues 
improperly raised and addressed by appellant for the first time 
on appeal? 
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IV. Whether Respondent is entitled to an award of attor-
neys' fees and double costs for the reason that the present 
appeal is frivolous, having no legal or factual basis? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
The Rules and Statutes relevant to a determinative resolu-
tion of this matter are: (1) Rule 33(a), Rules of the Court of 
Appeals; (2) Rules 8 and 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(3) Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 
1982); and (4) Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 
(1962). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is based upon an unrecognized theory of recovery 
asserted by attorney Irshad A. Aadil ("Aadil") against 
Respondent Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. ("Toyota"), in 
order to recover for Aadil's subjective dissatisfaction with 
the power and adequacy of the engine contained in the 1987 4x4 
Toyota Van. 
B. Course of Proceedings In Lower Court: 
1. On or about July 10, 1987, Aadil commenced this 
action on behalf of Sanjida Hasan, M. Hasan and himself by 
filing a Complaint which generally alleged plaintiffs' personal 
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dissatisfaction with the power and adequacy of the engine 
contained in Toyota's 1987 4x4 Van. (R. at 2-10.) 
2. On August 17, 1987, Toyota filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint based upon plaintiffs' failure to state 
any claim upon which relief could be granted, or in the 
alternative, for a More Definite Statement and to Strike. (R. 
at 29-30.) 
3. On October 16, 1987, at the hearing on Toyota's 
Motion to Dismiss, the court ordered Toyota to respond to 
plaintiffs' discovery requests and allowed plaintiffs an 
opportunity to amend their otherwise deficient Complaint. The 
court also continued the hearing on Toyota's Motion to Dismiss 
until the plaintiffs had an opportunity to amend their 
Complaint. (R. at 56.) 
4. Toyota answered Aadil's non-objectionable 
discovery requests on November 9, 1987. (R. at 61-62.) Aadil 
moved the court to compel discovery of matters to which Toyota 
had objected. (R. at 58-59.) At the hearing on Aadil's Motion 
to Compel, Judge Brian indicated that Toyota "responded in good 
faith in answering" Aadil's discovery requests, (R. at 80) and 
also allowed a supplemental discovery response which was filed 
by Toyota on February 2, 1988. (R. at 79-80.) 
5. Despite their inclusion in Aadil's List of 
Parties, (Appellant Brief at p. i), on December 18, 
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1987, the claims of Sanjida Hasan and M. Hasan were dismissed 
with prejudice. (R. at 84.) No appeal was taken from such 
dismissal. 
6. On April 5, 1988, Aadil filed his Amended 
Complaint with the lower court, alleging the same theories of 
recovery contained in his original Complaint. (R. at 85-98.) 
7. On May 12, 1988, Toyota filed a Second 
Supplemental Answer to Aadil's discovery requests which was 
composed of a simple acknowledgment of the existence of 
magazine test results, other than those contained in Toyota 
files, the contents of which Aadil already possessed. (R. at 
99.) 
8. On May 13, 1988, Toyota renewed its Motion To 
Dismiss which was heard by Judge Brian on May 27, 1988. (R. at 
101-102 and 118.) Judge Brian dismissed Aadil's claims with 
prejudice for the reason that the Amended Complaint failed to 
set forth any "short plain statement of claims showing the 
pleader to be entitled to relief." (R. at 143-144.) 
9. On June 2, 1988, the trial court entered its 
Order of Dismissal. (R. at 143-144.) Aadil's Notice of Appeal 
was filed on July 1, 1988. (R. at 157.) 
B. Statement Of Facts 
The unsupported Statement of the Case contained in 
Aadil's opening brief goes beyond the Record and reasonable 
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inferences which might be made therefrom. Therefore, Toyota 
offers the following Statement of Facts to accurately present 
and clarify the Record. 
1. Plaintiff allegedly purchased a 1987 Toyota 4x4 
Van. (R. at 90.) 
2. Plaintiff alleged that the engine was not as 
powerful as he subjectively desired. (R. at 89, 90 and 91.) 
3. Aadil did not allege that the engine he actually 
received was physically different from what was represented, or 
that the engine for the subject Van contained any defect. 
(R. at 85-92.) 
4. Count I of Aadil's Amended Complaint, brought on 
behalf of Sanjida and M. Hasan asserts the Hasan's opinion that 
the subject van "did not have an adequate and competent 
engine." (R. at 89.) 
5. The claims of Sanjida Hasan and M. Hasan have 
been dismissed with prejudice. (R. at 83.) The Stipulation 
and Order of Dismissal is signed by Aadil. ^d. 
6. Count II of Aadil's Amended Complaint alleges 
that the engine of the subject van failed to show its "real 
guts" after the initial fifteen hundred miles. (R. 90.) 
7. Count III of Aadil's Amended Complaint alleges 
that Toyota neglected to install an "adequate" engine in the 
- 5 -
subject van and that due to such alleged neglect, Aadil has 
suffered inconvenience and hardship. (R. at 91.) 
8. Count IV of Aadil's Amended Complaint alleges 
that Toyota knowingly and willfully misrepresented the perfor-
mance of the engine with which the subject van is equipped. 
(R. at 91.) 
9. Aadil failed to assert any factual basis for the 
allegation that Toyota "knowingly" or "willfully" 
misrepresented the performance of the subject van's engine. 
(R. at 88-92.) 
10. The Amended Complaint did not allege and Aadil 
did not present any argument with respect to the following 
issues, addressed for the first time in Aadil's appellate brief 
(a) products liability; 
(b) "Lemon Law Reform" and "breach of agreement;" 
(c) choice of remedies; and 
(d) "culpable conduct" of Toyota. (R. at 88-92.) 
11. The Amended Complaint did not allege any breach 
of warranty. (R. at 88-92.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The focus of Toyota's response to Aadil's attempted appeal 
is upon the deficiency of Aadil's Amended Complaint and its 
failure to state any legal claim upon which relief can be 
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granted. The Amended Complaint in the instant case does not 
even satisfy the minimal requirements of Rules 8 and 12 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Critically, Aadil admits in his 
brief that his claims for recovery are based upon "belief" and 
"internal reliance." Under these circumstances, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently declared that general accusa-
tions in the nature of conclusions of the pleader will not 
stand up against a motion to dismiss, especially where, as 
here, plaintiff does not suggest that the subject van engine 
was physically different from what was represented or that the 
engine contained any physical defect. Indeed, plaintiff's 
allegations are not only inadequately conceived, but also fail 
to provide notice of any recognized legal claim. 
Although Aadil suggests that the judgment of dismissal in 
this matter was inappropriately entered, Aadil had adequate 
time to prepare an amended pleading. Nevertheless, Aadil 
failed to modify the Counts of his original Complaint, even 
after being allowed to conduct discovery and after the lapse of 
several months. In addition, the Court properly entered its 
judgment of dismissal after service of the proposed Order to 
Aadil. Accordingly, Aadil abandoned any objections he may have 
made as to the form of such Order by failing to secure a ruling 
with respect thereto. In any event, Aadil's objections are 
denied by necessary implication. 
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Although Aadil raises numerous issues relating to warranty, 
breach of agreement, Lemon Law reform and merchantability, none 
of these arguments are contained within the Amended Complaint 
and were not sufficiently raised before the trial court to 
obtain a ruling thereon. Therefore, such arguments cannot be 
properly considered by this Court because they were presented 
for the first time on appeal. 
Finally, because this appeal is taken without any legal or 
factual basis, and because Aadil has harassed Toyota through 
other litigation, Toyota is entitled to an award of double 
costs and attorneys' fees due to the frivolous nature of this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
A. Count I of Aadil's Amended Complaint Relating to the 
Claims of Sanjida Hasan and M. Hasan Has Been 
Dismissed with Prejudice. 
Count I of the Amended Complaint deals only with the claims 
of Sanjida Hasan and M. Hasan. (R. at 83.) On December 15, 
1987, Aadil, attorney for the Hasans, stipulated and moved the 
lower Court for an order of dismissal with prejudice of the 
claim asserted by the Hasans, JCd. Based upon the Stipulation 
and Motion of the parties, the lower Court entered its Order 
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dismissing the Hasan claims with prejudice. (R. at 84.) No 
appeal was taken from such Order. Accordingly, Count I of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint cannot, under any set of facts 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the lower 
Court's Order must be affirmed. 
B. Counts II And III of Aadil's Amended Complaint Do Not 
Satisfy the Requirements of Rules 8 and 12, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the objective of 
Rules 8 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
is to require that the essential facts upon which 
redress is sought be set forth with simplicity, 
brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be 
determined whether there exists a legal basis for the 
relief claimed and, if so, so that there will be a 
clearly defined foundation upon which further 
proceedings by way of . . . trial can go forward in an 
orderly manner. 
Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990, 992 (1962). 
The Utah Supreme Court declared that general accusations in 
the nature of conclusions of the pleader "will not stand up 
against a Motion to Dismiss. ..." Heathman, 372 P.2d at 
991. The Court also declared that "[a] Complaint must give the 
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds 
of the claims and general indication of the type of litigation 
involved. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 
P.2d 1019, 1020 (1970) . 
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Aadil's Amended Complaint fails to meet these standards. 
In his Amended Complaint, Aadil alleges that he was personally 
dissatisfied with the power and adequacy of the subject van's 
engine. (R. at 90-92.) Aadil did not, however, even suggest 
that the van's engine was physically different from what was 
represented or that the engine contained any physical defect. 
Rather, Aadil merely asserted his personal disagreement with 
Toyota's advertising which states that its van was capable of 
"quick acceleration" and a "nimble mover." Notably, Aadil's 
Amended Complaint does not contain any allegation of "breach 
of warranty," "Duty" or "Merchantability" as Aadil now argues 
on appeal. (Aadil Brief at pp. 13-17.) Instead Aadil's 
pleading merely complains generally that the engine contained 
in Toyota's 1987 424 van was not as powerful as he would have 
liked it to be. (R. at 88-92.) 
For example, Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges the 
van failed to demonstrate its "real guts." (R. at 90.) No 
such vague and subjective theory of recovery can or should be 
recognized by this Court. Count III of plaintiff's Complaint 
is likewise, based solely upon plaintiff's subjective dissatis-
faction with the "adequacy" of the engine installed in the 
subject van. (R. at 91.) Under these circumstances, Aadil 
urges this Court to allow recovery because "he strongly 
believes" that there are questions as to "warranty, duty and 
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merchantability." (Aadil1s brief at p. 16.) Nevertheless, 
Aadil acknowledges that he "does not claim his expert witnesses 
are absolutely right" or that "he has greater chance of pre-
vailing than" Toyota. Id. In summary, Aadil was subjectively 
disappointed with is 1987 Toyota 4x4 van and believes, without 
more, he is entitled to recover carnages. 
In support of his nebulous allegations of dissatisfaction, 
Aadil cites: Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales Inc., 557 P.2d 
1009 (Utah 1976); Seekinqs v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 638 
P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1981); Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 2d 545, 236 
P.2d 451 (1951); Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 166 P.2d 
536 (1946); and Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 
p.2d 205 (1953). None of these cited authorities serve to 
validate Aadil's unrecognized and ill conceived theories of 
recovery. On the contrary, Aadil's cited authorities support 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss and are otherwise distinguished 
from and not applicable to the instant case. 
For example, in Christopher, the Court stated that: 
In transactions such as the sale of a motor vehicle a 
certain amount of sales talk or "puffing" by the 
seller is to be expected, for which the law should 
make due allowance. 
Christopher, 557 P.2d at 1013. Surely, Toyota's statements 
that its van is capable of "quick acceleration" and that it is 
a "nimble mover" are acceptable sales talk and puffing for 
- 11 -
which Utah law makes due allowance. Furthermore, the 
Christopher, decision is clearly distinguished from the facts 
of the instant case because the vehicle in Christopher, 
contrary to dealer warranties, was not what it was represented 
to be and had various physical defects, including: 
difficulty in starting, the engine overheating, the 
transmission slipping in and out of gear, the interior 
auxiliary motor refusing to operate, and the interior 
appliances, including the sink and toilet, not working 
properly. 
Id. at 1011. In contrast, the engine in the Toyota 1987 4x4 
van purchased by Aadil was precisely what it was represented to 
be, a "2.2 liter 4 cylinder overhead valve EFI engine that 
develops 101 hp," without any physical defect. Aadil merely 
complained that the van engine did not satisfy him personally. 
Similarly, the Seekinqs decision is inapplicable to this 
case because the plaintiffs therein discovered and alleged that 
the vehicle purchased had physical defects as follows: 
the gas gauge and power generator did not work, the 
furnace would not start, the carburetor did not func-
tion properly, and the gas mileage was poor . . . . 
the passenger door was drafty, the motor stalled, the 
air conditioner malfunctioned, and sewage backed upon 
into the bathtub. 
Seekinqs, 638 P.2d at 213. In contrast, Aadil simply maintains 
that he should be compensated for his subjective dissatis-
faction and his "inner reliance on Toyota." (Aadil's Brief at 
pp. 14 and 16.) 
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The Winegar decision is also distinguished from the instant 
case for the reason that the plaintiff alleged negligent repair 
of a vehicle's oil line as opposed to an undefined personal 
dissatisfaction with a product's composition. Winegar, 252 
P.2d at 206. Critically, all of Aadil's cited authorities 
involved claims of breach of warranty. No such claim is even 
mentioned in Aadil's Amended Complaint. (R. at 85-92.) 
Both the Morris and the Nielson decisions are inapplicable 
to the instant case because the plaintiffs therein were given a 
product or payment other than what they were represented to 
be. In Morris, the plaintiff was promised pay of one hundred 
dollars per month but never received any such payment in over a 
six years of employment. Morris, 236 P.2d at 454. In Nielson, 
the plaintiff was promised "Federation seed wheat," but the 
evidence was that he received something different. Nielson, 
166 P.2d at 538. In the instant case there is no allegation 
that the engine received by Aadil was physically different from 
what was represented, or that the van engine had any defect. 
(R. at 85-92.) 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, public policy 
weighs heavily against recovery for Aadil's subjective 
dissatisfaction with a product which has no physical defect and 
which is precisely what it was represented to be. If Aadil 
desired a more powerful vehicle, he should have purchased an 
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automobile with a larger engine. Clearly, the judicial process 
should not be used for the purpose of litigating an 
individual's general accusations and unsupported conclusions in 
the form of vague and unrecognized theories of recovery. 
Because Counts II and III of Aadil's Amended Complaint 
constitute general accusations in the nature of Aadil's 
personal dissatisfaction and conclusory opinion, they fail to 
give Toyota fair notice of any recognized legal claims or the 
nature and basis of such claims. Accordingly, Counts II and 
III of the Amended Complaint cannot "stand up against a Motion 
to Dismiss ..." Heathman, 372 P.2d at 991. 
C. Count IV of Aadil's Amended Complaint Constitutes A 
General Accusation In The Nature Of A Conclusion Of 
The Pleader And Is Subject To Dismissal As A Matter Of 
Law. 
When the pleader complains of conduct described as knowing 
and willful misrepresentation, the allegation of the conclusion 
is not sufficient. "The pleading must describe the nature or 
substance of the acts or words complained of." Williams v. 
State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). 
In Williams, Supreme Court clearly stated the scope and 
necessity of particularized pleading as follows: 
The rule 9(b) [Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] 
requirement should not be understood as limited to 
allegations of common-law fraud. The purpose of that 
requirement dictates that it reach all circumstances 
where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepre-
sentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by 
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the term "fraud" in its broadest dimension. 
Consequently, if the pleading had merely alleged that 
the insured had given "fraudulent" or "deceptive" or 
"misrepresenting" answers, it would have been 
insufficient. 
Indeed with respect to allegations of fraud and misrepresen-
tation, Rule 9(b) specifies that "the circumstances 
constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity." 
In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 267-68, 372 P.2d 990, 991 
(1962), a complaint charging a lawyer with "fraud," 
"conspiracy," and "negligence" was dismissed for failure to 
state a cause of action. In affirming unanimously, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
It is to be noted that the terms "fraud," "conspiracy" 
and "negligence" are but general accusations in the 
nature of conclusions of the pleader. They will not 
stand up against a motion to dismiss on that ground. 
Id. 
In the instant case Count IV states unsupported allegations 
of willful misrepresentation, without making any plain 
statement of the prima facie elements of any recognized cause 
of action or of facts upon which such any such claim might be 
based. In short, the Amended Complaint fails to provide any 
simple, concise or direct allegation of legal impropriety. 
If, a Complaint fails to provide notice of the nature and 
basis of the claim, the court has held that "it is clear beyond 
question that no claim [is] stated upon which relief [can] be 
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granted." Utah Steel, 475 P.2d at 1020. As noted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, the plaintiff has the responsibility to set 
forth "basic facts . . . with sufficient particularity to show 
what facts are claimed to constitute such charges." Williams 
v. State Farm Insurance, 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Having 
failed this burden, Aadil's claims of knowing and willful 
misrepresentation must be dismissed. This is especially true 
in the context of the sale of a vehicle, where the Utah Supreme 
Court has declared that "a certain amount of sales talk or 
'puffing' by the seller is to be expected, for which the law 
should make due allowance." Christopher, 557 P.2d at 1013. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW. 
A. Aadil Failed to Refer to the Record to Factually 
Support His Contentions on Appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, 
an appellant does not support facts set forth in his or her 
Brief with citations to the Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 
612, 613 (Utah 1987) and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 
(Utah 1982). In Trees, this Court declared that it: 
will assume the correctness of the judgment below 
where counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citation of the pages in the record where 
they are supported. (Citations omitted.)1 
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief referred 
to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no 
citations to the Record. Occasional references to the record 
appeared in the Argument section of the Brief. Trees, 738 P.2d 
at 612, n.2. 
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982), the Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contention on appeal. 
In the instant case, despite references to his own 
Addendum, containing information provided for the first time an 
appeal and otherwise outside the scope of the Record, Aadil 
failed to refer to the Record to support any of the factual 
contentions contained in paragraphs 1-11, 19, 22-24, 27-28 of 
his Statement of the Case. (Aadil*s Brief at pp. 4-6, 8-10.) 
1Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Court of Appeals, which became 
effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced former Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the 
requirement that citations to the record to support the fact 
statement in the Briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3. 
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Likewise, Aadil's Statement of the Nature of the Proceedings is 
unsupported, argument of counsel and otherwise mischaracterizes 
the claims contained in Aadil's Amended Complaint. The other 
paragraphs contained in Aadil's Statement of the Case merely 
make reference to the case's procedural history and include 
Aadil's own editorial and argumentative commentary. Accord-
ingly, this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment 
below based upon Aadil's failure to refer to any factual 
support in the Record, and may affirm the judgment on this 
independent basis. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Aadil's Ill-
Conceived and Unrecognized Theories of Recovery. 
Aadil contends that the lower Court's Order of Dismissal 
should be reversed because he was not allowed a sufficient 
opportunity to amend his Complaint and because the Court 
improperly entered its Order of Dismissal with prejudice prior 
to the expiration of five days from service of such document. 
Aadil's contentions, however, are unsupported by the facts and 
law as set forth in detail below. 
Aadil's contention that there was no opportunity to amend 
his Complaint is so transparently contrived as to warrant 
sanctions for a frivolous appeal. The facts of this case 
demonstrate that Appellant had ample opportunity to amend his 
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Complaint. At the initial hearing on Toyota's Motion to 
Dismiss in October of 1987, the Court indicated that Aadil's 
Complaint was deficient. As an accommodation to Aadil, the 
Court allowed certain discovery to proceed in order to provide 
for a possible amended complaint. (R. at 56.) The Court also 
continued Toyota's Motion to Dismiss to a future date, due to 
the obvious lack of any factual or legal basis for relief in 
the original Complaint. 
Toyota provided a good faith discovery response to Aadil by 
November 9, 1987. (R. at 61-62.) On February 2, 1988, Toyota 
provided Aadil with a complete Supplemental discovery response, 
with the limited exception of Toyota's May 12, 1988 acknowledge-
ment of the existence of certain magazine articles already in 
Aadil's possession. (R. at 99.) Thus, Appellant had numerous 
months to prepare an Amended Complaint and to remove the claims 
of the Hasans which had been previously dismissed from his 
Complaint. Indeed, Appellant had at least ten days to prepare 
an amended complaint following the filing of Toyota's Second 
Supplemental Discovery Response and before the hearing on 
Toyota's Motion to Dismiss. 
Moreover, the Second Supplemental Discovery Response added 
nothing to the information already available to Aadil as early 
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as February 2, 1988.2 (R. at 99.) Appellant's contention 
concerning the provision of only a "rough draft" of an Amended 
Complaint to Mr. Chai is hardly tenable in light of the fact 
that the alleged "draft" was also filed as Aadil's Amended 
Complaint with the lower court on April 5, 1988. Appellant's 
suggestion that it was evident that the Amended Complaint was 
only a "rough draft" based upon the list of parties that needed 
to be removed is likewise untenable for the reason that the 
same parties are currently listed in Aadil's appellate brief at 
p. i. 
Under these circumstances, the trial court properly 
reviewed the pleadings of record and determined that Aadil's 
essentially unchanged Amended Complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 
2The February 2, 1988 response to Interrogatory No. 15 states 
as follows: 
15. Please state the names of the magazines 
which have tested your 1985, 1986 and 1987 van models. 
ANSWER: Vans & Trucks, Truckin' and Motor 
Trend. Attached are copies of these articles. 
The May 12, 1988 discovery response merely acknowledged the 
following: 
Interrogatory No. 15: Please state the names of the 
magazines which have tested your 1985, 1986 and 1987 van 
models. 
ANSWER: Toyota acknowledges the existence of magazine 
test results other than those contained in Toyota files. 
Copies of materials provided by Irshad Aadil are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." (R. at 99.) 
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Aadil's contentions relative to the provisions of Rule 2.9 
of the Rules of Practice for the District Courts are likewise 
inapplicable in the instant case. Aadil contends that Rule 2.9 
was violated as a result of the court's signing of the Order of 
Dismissal prior to the expiration of five days from service of 
documents and prior to Aadil's submission of objections. 
Under similar circumstances, in Tolboe Construction Co. v. 
Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court concluded that: 
The fact that the court signed the documents prior to 
plaintiffs' submission of objections and prior to the 
expiration of five days from the service of the 
documents, does not constitute a violation of this 
latter requirement. The requirement as well as the 
rule itself are binding only upon counsel, not upon 
the trial court. The rule does not therefore preclude 
the court from signing the documents, as it did, 
within five days of their service upon counsel. 
In the instant case, Toyota sent a copy of its proposed Order 
to Appellant on May 31, 1988. (Appellant's Brief at p. A-16.) 
Toyota's proposed Order was neither signed nor filed by the 
Court until June 2, 1988. Under these circumstances, the Court 
was not precluded from signing and entering its Order. Tolboe, 
682 P.2d at 849. 
Any Objection to the Order of Dismissal must be considered 
abandoned because Aadil failed to secure a "ruling on [his] 
claimed pending" objection. In Zions First National Bank v. 
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C'Est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980), the court 
noted: 
The Rules of Civil Procedure are so designed as to 
promote the finality of judgments by an expeditious 
resolution of any post-judgment motions. 
Not only did the unmodified judgment of dismissal have the 
effect of denying Aadil's objections by necessary implication, 
but the action of Aadil also indicated an intention to abandon 
the pending objections by pursuing this appeal, without first 
securing a ruling on his objections. _Id. Accordingly, Aadil's 
assertion of impropriety lacks both legal support and factual 
merit. 
POINT III 
AADIL"S IMPROPERLY RAISED CONTENTIONS CANNOT 
BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held 
that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik 
v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); and Insley 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 
(Utah 1986). 
This Court has stated that the record must clearly show 
that an issue was "timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. We cannot assume 
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that it was properly raised." Franklin Financial v. Empire 
Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). If a party 
fails to present an issue to the trial court, they will have 
"waived the right to raise it" on appeal. Utah County v. 
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, Aadil alleges numerous legal arguments 
and facts which are beyond the scope of the Record and does so 
for the first time on appeal. One example of Aadil's flagrant 
disregard of this appellate rule is the submission of the 
Affidavit of Lynn Ashcroft (Appellant's Brief at A-14). The 
affidavit was never submitted to the trial court. Indeed, the 
affidavit was not even created until more than nine months 
after entry of final judgment in this case. 
Appellant has also included arguments relative to pro-
visions of the Utah Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-1, 
et seq. warranty provisions, Lemon Law Reform, breach of 
agreement and merchantability, none of which were even included 
within the allegations of Aadil's Amended Complaint. (Aadil's 
Brief at pp. 13-17.) Accordingly, these arguments should not 
be considered for the first time by this Court on appeal. 
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POINT IV 
TOYOTA IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND DOUBLE COSTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE 
PRESENT APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS, HAVING NO LEGAL 
OR FACTUAL BASIS. 
In Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 366 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court recognized that sanctions should be imposed for frivolous 
appeals: 
This court is distressed both by the frivolous nature 
of this appeal and by plaintiff's apparent harassment 
of defendant through repeatedly bringing civil actions 
against her, thereby forcing her to pay substantial 
court costs and attorney's fees. Rule 33(a) of the 
Rules of Utah Court of Appeals provides that "[i]f the 
court determines that a motion made or an appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages and single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party." 
A frivolous appeal is defined as "one having no reasonable 
legal or factual basis . . . ." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 
310 (Utah App. 1987); see also Barber v. The Emporium 
Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the instant case, there is no legal or factual basis for 
this appeal. Indeed, most of the argument stated in Aadil's 
brief constitutes unsupported facts, opinions or issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. In addition, this is the second 
claim made against Respondent for a Toyota vehicle purchased by 
Aadil in recent years. (R. at 82.) It appears to Toyota that 
appellant has brought these lawsuits for apparent harassment 
- 24 -
through repeatedly bringing civil actions. The fact that Mr. 
Aadil is an attorney and should know better than to bring such 
a cause of action based upon no recognized legal theory of 
recovery only serves to emphasize the fact that sanctions 
should be imposed. 
In imposing sanctions upon Mr. Aadil, there will be no 
improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court 
decisions. This is especially true inasmuch as the lower court 
gave Aadil an opportunity to conduct discovery and several 
months to amend his pleading. Nevertheless, attorney Aadil 
still failed to modify the allegation of his original 
Complaint. Most importantly, Aadil failed to make any short 
plain statement of any claim for relief other than his own 
conclusory accusations. For these reasons, Aadil's appeal has 
no reasonable factual or legal basis and must be considered 
frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent Toyota Motor Sales 
U.S.A., Inc. respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
dismissal of Aadil's Amended Complaint with prejudice. Toyota 
further requests this Court to award attorneys fees and double 
costs, thus, remanding this matter to the trial court for a 
proper determination of the full amount of costs and attorney's 
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fees, without reduction, reasonably incurred by the defendant 
Toyota on this appeal. 
DATED this 21st day of April, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ^/^fjj/;, 
^Srry^. L 
Attorneys for 
Respondent/Defendant Toyota 
Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc. 
SCMLRL215 
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